The 20th century was marked by two devastating world wars, but Europe, with its complex historical roots and geopolitical tensions, remains fertile ground for conflict. Today’s global challenges, such as the war in Ukraine, growing nationalism, economic rivalries, and the strengthening and clashing military alliances between Nato and Russia, raise the question of the high risk of another large-scale conflict on the European continent. Today, several factors are contributing to a growing climate of tension in Europe. Tumultuous relations between Russia and NATO, exacerbated by crises such as Ukraine, have revived tensions from the Cold War era. Changes in global power dynamics, notably the emergence of powers such as China and India, are also influencing the military strategies of European nations.

The resurgence of nationalism in Europe is often accompanied by anti-European sentiments and distrust of international institutions. Countries such as Hungary and Poland are promoting policies that assert their sovereignty, sometimes to the detriment of European unity. These populist movements can fuel internal tensions and give rise to inter-state conflicts. The global economy is now interconnected, but this does not prevent the rise of economic rivalries between nations. Economic sanctions, trade wars and struggles for access to natural resources are creating friction. Europe, which relies heavily on imported energy, finds itself in a particularly vulnerable position, especially in the face of potential adversaries such as Russia. Military responses to these tensions are manifested in the strengthening of alliances such as NATO. Military exercises, increases in defense budgets and greater cooperation between European countries to deal with perceived threats are evidence of preparation for the possibility of conflict. In this context, the likelihood of misunderstanding or unintended escalation increases. Western support for Ukraine is certain to become more controversial in the year ahead. It is worth noting that in many ways it is less than meets the eye. In all, 39 countries have given or pledged some form of support totaling €250 billion, of which 16 countries plus the European Union contribute the vast majority. Those 39 countries represent 59% of global GDP, but only 11% of the world’s population.

Many countries in the so-called Global South have qualms about supporting Ukraine, which explains the last G-20 communique’s weak language on the subject. Those nations don’t buy the analogy of Russia’s land grab with European colonialism. They have reasons for not wanting to alienate Russia and its backer China. They hear the echoes of the Cold War and remember the arguments against being on the US side in what was then called the Third World. They resent that less attention is paid to wars in Africa (Ethiopia, Sudan). And they see the effects of the war on African food supplies as a compelling argument for a peace based on Ukrainian concessions. That means Ukraine is now mainly supported by the US and other Anglosphere countries (mainly the UK), and increasingly by the EU and its member states. In last February, according to the indispensable Ukraine Support Tracker, the English-speaking world was in the lead, accounting for half of all bilateral commitments to Ukraine. Now, the EU provides 53% of the total, compared with 37% in February 2024. On a country-by-country basis, it is true, the US provides 82% more support than the next-largest country, Germany. However, if one includes the cost of accommodating Ukrainian refugees and scales total assistance relative to GDP, the countries doing the most for Ukraine are Poland, the Baltic States and the Czech Republic.

The US has made bilateral commitments to Ukraine totaling $76.8 billion. Like anything involving the word “billion” that sounds like a lot of money. But it amounts to just 0.33% of U.S. GDP. If one considers only military aid to Ukraine, the US spent 15 times as much as a share of GDP on the Korean War, five times as much on the Vietnam War, five times as much on the Gulf War, and four times as much on the Iraq War. Europe prepares for the spectre of war. Earlier this year, Micael Bydén, Commander-in-Chief of the Swedish Armed Forces, urged citizens to prepare for conflict. Carl-Oscar Bohlin, Minister for Civil Defense, directly linked the military threat to Vladimir Putin’s actions in Ukraine. In the wake of these events, a wave of alarmist statements emanated from European political and military circles concerning the prospect of imminent war.

War in just a year or in two decades hence — lies a significant portion of more authoritative forecasts than the fantasies of the international tabloid press. Given the losses Russia continues to sustain in Ukraine, experts generally agree that it will take the country’s armed forces anywhere from 6 to 10 years to restore their combat readiness to a level sufficient for even a limited conflict with NATO. Boris Pistorius mentions a range of 5 to 8 years. Danish Defense Minister Troels Lund Poulsen leans towards 3-5 years. The commander of the Norwegian Army, General Eirik Kristoffersen, estimates a period of 2-3 years. Adding fuel to the fire are the shocking statements of Donald Trump, who openly declared that he would encourage Russia to engage in aggressive actions (literally “do whatever the hell it wants”) against those NATO countries that do not spend enough on defense, meaning less than 2% of GDP. As early as 2020, President Trump told European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen that he would not come to Europe’s aid in the event of war, would withdraw from NATO, and also asked his interlocutor to “repay the debt” of $400 billion that the Germans had “saved” on defense spending by relying on America’s commitment to the NATO Article 5 guarantee of collective defense. According to Ursula von der Leyen, while a war in Europe is not imminent, it is no longer inconceivable. The pressing question, posed by experts and journalists alike, is whether Europe is prepared to defend itself against Russian aggression without the direct assistance of the United States.

Over the past 30 years, European countries have significantly reduced military spending, downsized their armies, widely abandoned conscription, and scrapped or sold to third countries massive volumes of military equipment and weaponry. The end of the Cold War freed up colossal resources: all armies worldwide (not just European ones) underwent similar processes of downsizing and reorientation towards counterinsurgency and humanitarian missions, as the likelihood of a major war between states was deemed negligible. The size and capability of European armed forces across various branches and types of military equipment were reduced several times over in the 30 years from 1992-2022. More expensive and effective, yet much less numerous “low-volume” platforms replaced decommissioned models. In particular, the number of tanks in service among leading countries (Germany, France, the United Kingdom, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Spain, and Turkey) has decreased from 18,941 to 4,362, fighter jets from 3,660 to 1,586, major surface warships from 180 to 109, and submarines from 107 to 57.

The decommissioning of Cold War-era equipment and the slow replacement of older systems with high-tech gear have combined to ensure that outdated weaponry still dominates the overall composition of armed forces. In Europe, approximately 50% of ground equipment was introduced before 1990 or is based on technologies and solutions developed at that time; for air forces, the figure is around 35%; for navies, it is estimated at between 40-50%. Furthermore, even existing equipment is often not maintained properly. Consider the episode in which it took millions of Euros and several months to repair six Spanish Leopard 2 tanks before sending them to Ukraine. Needless to say, the readiness levels of available military equipment and weaponry in Europe do not strike fear in the hearts of potential enemies. Reductions have also impacted the size of armed forces. In 1991, nearly 1 million NATO soldiers were stationed in Central and Northern Europe alone. By the end of the 2010s, that number was below 400,000. Although the total number of armed forces personnel in European NATO member countries stands at just under 2 million, Turkey accounts for 460,000 of these. France, with only 200,000 active duty personnel, fields the largest army on the continent.

As a result, European militaries are often referred to as “bonsai armies,” miniature versions of genuine forces. This approach was logical within the concept that assigned continental armed forces a supporting role in containing conflicts with the expectation that swift U.S. intervention was on the way. But given Trump’s campaign rhetoric, European NATO members have been forced to reevaluate that conceptual framework. Since 1990, the vast European defense industry has also been consistently downsized, losing some of its crucial capabilities. For instance, since 2008, Europe has essentially had only one production line for modern main battle tanks — that of the German Leopard 2. As of February 2023, the manufacturing capacities of all EU countries could produce only an estimated 230,000 artillery munitions per year — roughly the monthly consumption rate during the war in Ukraine. France is currently capable of producing only 2,000 artillery rounds per month and, though it is planning to increase production to 3,000 units. In the context of the ongoing conflict in Ukraine, this quantity would only suffice for one day of combat operations with maximum ammunition conservation.

It’s no wonder that E.U. countries failed to fulfill their promise to deliver 1 million artillery munitions to the Ukrainian Armed Forces by March 2024. During almost two years of war, they managed to send only 300,000 155mm caliber rounds. According to some estimates, at the peak of artillery fire intensity during the offensive in Donbass in the summer of 2022, the Russian Armed Forces was using more artillery ammunition in two days than the British Army held in its entire stockpile. Similarly, the Bundeswehr likely has ammunition reserves capable of lasting for just two days of combat operations. As it stands, Europe appears ill-equipped for a classical war demanding substantial quantities of equipment and ammunition. In the absence of direct U.S. participation, European nations would find themselves vulnerable, particularly in unconventional conflicts such as nuclear confrontations. The European nuclear powers, France and the United Kingdom, jointly possess only 500 warheads, a fraction of the Russian arsenal. On the other hand, France’s historical nuclear doctrine did not focus on using the limited number of special munitions on the battlefield. Instead, it centered on the threat of targeting Soviet cities to deter the USSR from attacking France. However, pertinent questions arise about how effective this strategy might prove in safeguarding not just French, but also “pan-European” interests. In discussing the European nuclear doctrine, whether President Emmanuel Macron is prepared to sacrifice Paris to defend Tallinn. The likelihood of conflict in Europe – As long as the Russian army remains engaged in its conflict with Ukraine, the prospect of a new war, particularly involving a NATO member, seems remote. Nevertheless, some Western experts and policymakers operate under the assumption that although Russian ground forces have suffered significant losses in Ukraine, their air and naval forces retain considerable combat capabilities. And of course, the Russian nuclear arsenal remains as strong as it was in February 2022.

The Kremlin’s somewhat credulously received assertions regarding unprecedented growth in the defense sector and exceptional rates of volunteer recruitment contribute to the prevailing sense of threat over Europe. Notably, claims of annual production of 4 million artillery shells and the enlistment of 400,000 contractors without the need for mobilization underscore this concern, even if the actual numbers are likely somewhat less than Moscow says they are. Concurrently, European nations have significantly depleted their stocks of armaments, transferring a substantial amount of equipment not only from storage but also directly from their national armed forces.  Europe faces a decade-long task to restore its stockpiles to pre-Ukraine war levels. This situation could potentially be seen by Moscow as a “window of opportunity,” particularly if there are doubts raised about the willingness of the U.S. to defend its European allies. For Russia, sustaining military expenditure at more than 40% of the total federal budget and 6% of the national GDP over an extended period seems highly improbable. Indeed, President Putin himself openly asserts that the West will not be able to “replicate the trick of the 1980s” and draw Russia into an arms race. It will be difficult for Russia to sustain military expenditure at more than 40% of the total federal budget and 6% of the national GDP over an extended period. And when it comes to Russia’s Armed Forces,  the military apparatus under Putin’s leadership is experiencing both organizational and material-technical degradation. According to certain assessments, Russia is projected to reach the peak of its military capabilities in the period 2024-2025. Russia may find itself largely depleted in its ability to deploy equipment from storage, while the West would likely see a considerable uptick in the production of new equipment and ammunition. In essence, these indicators point not to an increase in Russia’s military strength, but rather to its gradual depletion. Naturally, this doesn’t rule out the possibility that the Kremlin could nevertheless instigate a new military conflict in Europe — its aggression against Ukraine underscores the unpredictability of the decision makers in Moscow. However, there are few tangible indicators arguing in favor of embarking on such a scenario, and even less likelihood of Russia achieving significant foreign policy aims through military means.

The pivotal question revolves around the outcome of the ongoing Russia-Ukraine conflict. It is plausible that new “special operations” in Central and Eastern Europe would only materialize if the Kremlin were to decisively prevail in Ukraine. This outcome appears probable only in the event that Kyiv’s allies fail to provide sufficient military support. Russia would likely be forced into a defensive posture, effectively precluding any prospect of further military engagements. Europe has become a subsidiary of the declining American empire, dragged along in the wake of the decline of the United States. A pact has bound Europe to the United States since 1945. Americanization, which has been intense since the 1980s, is both chosen by the elites and undergone by the people. As Emmanuel Todd writes, “the gradual implosion of WASP culture – white, Anglo-Saxon and Protestant – since the 1960s has created an empire devoid of center and project, an essentially military organization led by a group without culture – in the anthropological sense – whose fundamental values are power and violence”.The rest of the world is watching the West drift, determined not to get sucked into the void. So what does he do? He prefers to support Russia, which “has discovered discreet economic allies everywhere, a new soft power. »  The Russia-U.S. relations consequence is so huge that it is extremely difficult to clear it up even with very serious political will. Blind support for the Kiev regime and its attacks on Russian territory fragilize an attempt to approach the discussion of normalization of relations. With little indication of peace on the horizon and the threat of an even larger-scale confrontation still looming, we must cautioned against those who believe that through controlled escalation it is possible to avoid the worst and weaken Russia. The spectre of a world war in Europe is not simply a dystopian fiction, but a potentially worrying scenario given the current state of geopolitical affairs. Geopolitical tensions, growing nationalism, economic rivalries and coordinated military responses are setting the stage for a major crisis if diplomatic avenues are not found. It is imperative that European nations work together to avoid falling back into the mistakes of the past, in order to maintain peace and security on the continent.