Taiwan – Could US lose a war with China ?

Taiwan – Could US lose a war with China

If a war broke out between the United States and China, the clash between two of the world’s most powerful militaries would be horrific. And the United States could very well lose. That’s a concern among current and former defense officials and military analysts, in war games simulating great-power conflict in which the United States fights Russia and China, the United States will lose this war. Beijing considers Taiwan a Chinese province and China’s leaders have become increasingly strident about unifying the island with the mainland, therefore a military invasion is not out of the question.  Some U.S military leaders forewarned that a Taiwan invasion would take place by 2027, the year the Chinese People’s Liberation Army celebrates its centenary and China’s paramount leader Xi Jinping comes to the end of his third term.  Chinese experts have reportedly advised Xi Jinping to keep the new Trump administration’s attention riveted on Ukraine rather than Taiwan, which could be taken between 2025 and 2027. Beijing seems to see the world as a huge chessboard.

In this context, it is interesting to read an article published on the English-language website Japan Forward[1] by exiled Chinese dissident Jennifer Zeng. She notes that the idea of North Korean military involvement in Russia was reportedly recommended to Xi Jinping in September 2024 by a Chinese military think-tank with input from military and foreign ministry experts. The report, summarized by former Peking University professor Yuan Hongbing, whose analysis has been translated into English by Jennifer Zeng, discusses the response China should make to Donald Trump’s return to the White House. The report urges the acceleration of military, economic, and political readiness for potential operations against Taiwan. It aims to utilize the strategic window from 2025 to 2027, which is considered optimal for « addressing the Taiwan issue. » Otherwise, « resolving the Taiwan issue » would become extremely disadvantageous.

The general thesis of the report is that the second Trump presidency could be unfavorable to China, particularly with regard to its plans towards Taiwan. According to the report, Trump and the Republicans could adopt a very different strategy to that of Joe Biden, probably starting by pressuring Ukraine to trade territory for peace with Russia. Such a peace could ease relations between Russia and the United States, freeing up American military resources in Europe, but also in the Middle East, where a Russian-American détente would weaken Iran’s influence. It would also enable the United States to focus on the Indo-Pacific region, making it more difficult for China to achieve its objectives not only in Taiwan, but also in the South China Sea. Taiwan is a potential flashpoint in a new Cold War, this time between the United States, China and Russia. If a war broke out between the United States and China, the clash between two of the world’s most powerful militaries would be horrific. And the United States could very well lose. China’s military maneuvers in the China Sea have rekindled fears of conflict with Taipei, which continues to flaunt its independence ambitions. But a conflict in the strategic Taiwan Strait would be devastating for the global economy. China considers Taiwan to be one of its provinces, which it has not yet succeeded in reunifying with the rest of its territory since the end of the Chinese civil war in 1949. It does not rule out the use of force to achieve this.

The China of 2025 has little in common with the young Communist China of late 1949. Its spectacular economic development in the second half of the 20th century enabled it to assert itself as a superpower and enter into rivalry with the United States. But the geography of the East and South China Seas and the alliances of its neighbors are thwarting its ambitions. China’s 14,000 kilometers of coastline face what is known as the “first island chain”. Beijing is in a way confined to the China Seas, it doesn’t have free access to the Pacific Ocean, because it faces this string of islands which are countries with which it has relatively strained relations”. This first island chain is made up of four countries allied with the USA: South Korea, Japan, the Philippines and Taiwan. The first three have each signed a mutual defense treaty with the Americans, offering security guarantees that are considered vital by these countries. South Korea hosts two American naval air bases, and Japan six. Since 2014, a security agreement has also provided the US Air Force with five support points in the Philippines. A second chain is made up of the Northern Mariana Islands – home to the major US naval base in Guam – Palau (a territory formerly administered by the USA) and the Japanese archipelago of the Ogasawara Islands.

A military annexation of Taiwan would, among other things, clearly weaken the American presence in the region and assert Chinese dominance. Because of its central position, Taiwan is a kind of lock for China on the Pacific.  China is seeking to dismantle the network of American alliances in the region. The aim is for the Chinese army to be able to dissuade the United States from intervening in the region through denial-of-access tactics, which will make it much harder for the Americans to get close to China and Taiwan. And when the US is no longer in a position to defend Japan, the alliance will no longer hold. This possible disappearance of the United States as guarantor of security in the region would be a strategic turning point. There is a real risk of opening the way to wider nuclear proliferation in countries like South Korea, and possibly Japan. If these two countries can no longer rely on the American nuclear umbrella, they could seek to develop their own deterrent to ensure their security.  China will not be able to undo these security treaties between Japan, South Korea and the United States. Another of Beijing’s potential objectives concerns its nuclear deterrent, and in particular its oceanic component, as several geographical elements limit the maneuvering possibilities of Chinese ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs).

The current grid of two island chains makes it easy for US allies to spot Chinese submarines seeking access to the Pacific Ocean. The Japanese, Americans and Taiwanese have excellent anti-submarine warfare capabilities, and are capable of tracking this type of submarine. But above all, the South and East China Seas boast dense merchant traffic and shallow waters. Three quarters of the East China Sea is less than two hundred meters deep, which is not enough for Chinese submarines to dilute and maneuver discreetly, without being heard. SSBNs are restricted to the area around Hainan Island in the South China Sea. With their limited range, they cannot reach the continental United States. To do this, the Chinese have to rely on their ground-to-ground ballistic missiles, which are inherently more vulnerable than a submarine, which can hide more easily. Taiwan has the advantage of direct access to the deep ocean from its eastern coast. It would be an opportunity for China to build a new SSBN base and move closer to the American coast. For the United States, it would be a direct threat.

The conquest of Taiwan would serve other Beijing objectives, such as its numerous territorial and maritime claims. The issue of the Taiwan Strait must be seen in the wider context of the global expansion of Chinese maritime power. By controlling Taiwan, China could expand its exclusive economic zone and impose restrictions on shipping. While the immediate interest is in foreign military vessels, extending its sovereign zone would also enable China to assert control over merchant shipping – a powerful lever for exerting pressure on its neighbors or furthering its own interests. The Taiwan Strait is one of the maritime areas that China would like to control in its entirety, even though it is partly made up of international waters freely open to navigation. The prospect of Beijing controlling this main trade route between the South China Sea and the East China Sea is worrying South Korea and Japan, whose economies are heavily dependent on imports. The aim would also be to support China’s claims in the South China Sea, where Beijing is trying to consolidate its position, to the detriment of the Law of the Sea and its neighbors. These disputes mainly concern two archipelagos: the Paracels Islands, located in international waters to the south of China, and the Spratlys archipelago, situated between Vietnam, Malaysia and the Philippines, but which Beijing firmly claims, despite the remoteness of its coastline. A capture of Taiwan could even rekindle the dispute over the Senkaku Islands, an uninhabited Japanese archipelago not far from Taiwan’s eastern coast. It would not be impossible for the Chinese to try to bring the Japanese to heel in the region, something that seems to be of great concern to the Japanese authorities.

Finally, the seizure of Taiwan would also enable the Beijing regime to control the Taiwanese semiconductor industry, which accounts for a large proportion of global production (63%). These components, essential to the manufacture of high-tech products (telephones, aircraft, solar panels, etc.), are crucial to the global economy. The most advanced semiconductors are largely manufactured by the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC). Getting its hands on this industry would be an undeniable gain, but it’s not certain that Beijing could easily exploit it. TSMC is itself dependent on imported raw materials, notably from Japan and Germany, which could decide to reduce or suspend sales in the event of any attempt at destabilization on Beijing’s part.

Taiwan has many strategic aspects for Beijing. It is no longer a question of counterbalancing the United States, but of entering into a rivalry with the Americans, who, in Chinese discourse, have always been presented as a power outside Asia. And Taiwan is a major obstacle to China’s renaissance, which begs the question of a potential armed conflict, from which the United States would not necessarily emerge the winner.

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[1] « China’s CCP Makes Strategic Preparations for a Trump Victory » By Jennifer Zeng. Published October 30, 2024. « Exclusive: A recent Chinese military report delivers 3 strategic recommendations to Xi Jinping and the CCP on the prospect of Donald Trump’s US election win. » https://japan-forward.com/exclusive-china-ccp-prepares-for-a-trump-victory/